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I~TERTE~IPORAL SPECULATI0~1,
SHORT:`GES A~D THE POLITICr~L EC0~10~IY
OF PRICE REFOR~~I~`
,Sr.ueder uan 66'ijnber~rn
Hvw should prices be decuntrolled, slvwly or in a bi,g bang? Whv is it that
Governments committed tv eventual price flexibility so often seem to be unable
to let go of `temporary' contrvls? How can one explain that after price
increases early in a proqrammc of price controls, output often rises while at the
same time shortages also increase (Bresser, sg87?? This paper argues that
intertemporal speculation, hoardin,g and the pvlitícal economy of price reform
go a long way towards explainin.g all these puzzles. ~Ve show that the
interaction between shortages and pvlitical vulnerabilitv of reformist s;overn-
ments to early perceptivns of failure make lór a strong ar,gument Rgainst
gradualism in the decvntrol of prices.
Price controls are often used as substitutes for, rather than complements of,
regular fiscal and monetary restraint; thev thus ended up suppressing rather
than curing infiation. More recently they have scen more sophisticated use, as
transitional devices in stabilisation programmes that also encvmpassed
orthodox components ~Mexico and Israel are successful examples).
The literature on price controls has focused on their potential macro-
economic rationale (Dornbusch and Simonsen, tg87; Persson and van
1Nijnbergen, 1 g8g}. This paper abstracts from the question of why price
controls are used. Instead it asks a difíerent question, one that is perhaps of
greater practical importance: how to escape from a period of controls? The
issue is of much wider importance than the stabilisation policy examples
suggest; all of Eastern Europe has been living under price controls, imposed for
a verv difïerent reason. How should countries like Poland or the ex-L' SSR
move towards price Hexibility, gradually or in a`big bang'?
Two factors complicate the issue. Often price controls focus on commodities
that are storal~le and thus can be used in intertemporal speculation. This was
acute in Braail, where in tg8~ price controls were introduced which were verv
much seen as temporary. Bresser (tg87), who was the finance minister at the
time, states: `There was shortage of inerchandise in stores at the [same] time
that stocks were accummulating in the factories'.
The second factor is that opposition to rapid dismantling of controls is often
based on claims of low supply~ response, and greatly bolstered if a strong supply-
' Fnr claboration on some of the more technical details of this paper tha readcr is referred to the workinq
paper senion ican Wijnbergcn, tggt i, s.hich is as~ailable on request from the author. I am indebted to `tax
Corden, Ales Cukierman, .~ntonio Estachq Arye Hillman, Santiago Lecs, Dani Rodrik, Lars Svensson and
seminar participants at the ~Vorld Bank, the IMF, Princcton, Pennsyhania State and the wharton School
for helpful comments. The ciews esprcssed in this paper do not necessaril~. coíncide with those of the
institutions I am affiliated with.
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response indeed fails to materialise. This is especiall~~ relevant in places like
Eastern Europe, where experience with price responsive markets is limited. A
less benign argument also lends support to a link bet„'een low supply response
and opposition to relaxing controls. Shortages create rents, and rents will
attract lobbyists in favour of continuation of those policies that create the rents.
We show the difficulties that these two factors create for gradual decontrol
of prices. We endogenise the probability of a collapse of the reform programme
along the lines of the recent literature about the impact of political
considerations on economic policy (see in particular Alesina and Cukierman
( t ggo) ) and show that such endogeneity in thé presence of intertemporal
speculation leads to a strong case against gradualism.
I. SPECULATION AND SUPPLI' RESPONSE TO GRADUAL
PRICE DECONTROL
I. t. The Basic Model
The traded sector uses labour only, and at constant returns to scale; thus the
real wage w is fixed in terms of traded goods. Returns to scale are decreasing
in the non-traded sector, because of a fixed factor in the background (land).
There are many producers, s0 individual producers cannot affect the price, or,
in the case ofcontrols, aggregate shortages. Non-traded output toda}~ equals I',
and output tomorrow y. The cost function far current ( future) non-traded
production equals C' (c) :
i7)
Capital ( lower casej letters represent first {second~ period variables.
Output produced todav can be sold toda~. or stored for sale tomorro~ti-. Since
there are only two periods, output produced tomorrow will be full~. sold. CToods
stored toda~., S', lead to goods available from stora,,e in period ~ according to
the technolog}. ~:
S- rr~(S) i ~(O) - O, O G~i' C I, ~!" G O. (~)
Part Of goods stored goes t0 waste due to spoilage, pests and so on. Thus there
are positive marginal costs of storage (yi' e t j. ~~'e also assume that the
marginal costs increase with the amount stored ~~" c o).
The market clearing price in period t f2) is P~` 'p~`1. Controls are imposed
in the non-traded sector only. Beforr the announcement of decontrol, prices
were set at P, - p„ C P~`,~i~`, G'old turlcey drennlrol implies immcdiate transition to
market prices in both periads. Cradual deconlrol implies a pricc- increasr in lieriud
t that falls short of;oing to market prices: P~ e P~` ; whilc a full move tu markc~t
prices is announced for period two.
Call p the probability that the decontrol program will be abandoned. 11'e
assumc that when the programme of gradual decontrol is abandoned in pcriod
~., the controls will be kept at their levrl of pcrir~d t, i.e. in that ca;e ~~9 - 1'p. A
C' - C(w, 3') ; C,,., Cj., Cy.s. ~ ol
C- C(1L', tf ); Cu., fY, C~y ~ O. J}
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collapse ol thc c.old turkcy clecontrol programme does not have such an ohvious
delàult position; we assume that if the cold turkey programme collapses, prices
in period two will he sct at thc pre-decontrol Ievel P~. Both producers and
consumers takc P as uivcn.
Producers ha~e to choose today's output and level of inventories before
knowing whethcr the C,vvernment will implement its announcements for
period two or whether the programme will coliapse halfway. However second
period output can be chosen after period 1 Government policies have become
clear. The second perioci pmduction decision is thus a simple static optimisation
problem:
Nocollapse: ~Iax(p~`[y~`f~(,S)]-c(w,y~`)iyCy(y~`) -p~`,
Colla Se: ~Iax;P -F- (,5' clw '-yc ! ) -P.P~ ~(y~ 4~ ) ]- ,y~)f „ y~ ,
(3)
[n general p9 ~ p~. ~1~'e will however omit the subscript.
In period one producers have to choose output Y and the part of output put
in storage. S, knowing that in period two thev will follow the rules laid out in
(3). This leads to the following masimisation problem:
íV1ax ( Y-S1 Pp-C'(w, Y) fa',P{(y~-~(.S)]p-c(w,yj} subject to o~.S c Y
,~, s
(4)
rs - t ~( t f r) with r the exogenous world real interest rate in terms of traded
goods. ~r7 is the expectations operator. The first order conditions are:
CY-Po~~' ~
-P9fS~'~up-~.l-fc - o. ~
(~)
.l(~e) is the shadow price associated with tkie constraint S 1 o(S e Y). (~)
indicates that output will be increased until its marginal cost equals the value
of an extra unit of output. This latter value equals the price plus any additional
shadow price picked up by im-entories if they are constrained by the fact that
additions to inventories cannot exceed total production.
Inventories are chosen so as to equalise the value of an extra unit of output
today ( P~) with the discounted value of an ertra unit tomorrow (drr5'rB9 pl. Of
course if inventories hit a corner solution ( o or Y), that equality cannot be
brought about and either.t or,te becomes positive, driving a wedge bet~veen the
marginal benefit of an extra sale today versus an extra sale tomorrow. Clearly,
higher prices lead to higher output in each period:
~
dP - C:.
~ o, p~ - cYy(y~`) ~ o~ dPo - cYV (y~)
~ o. (6)
D
The analysis for `cold turkev' decontrol follows along similar lines.
The consumer chooses between Traded and Non-Traded goods each period,
and allocates expenditure over today and tomorrow. An expenditure function
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describes aggregate consumer behaviour' ; without rationing, this function
gives the minimum level of expenditure necessary to reach welfare level U:
E- E[n (P'~ t), an(p~`, t), Cr]- (7)
The derivatives ofE with respect to prices yield tlie Hicksian demand functions.
17 and n are exact price indices for current and future consumption
corresponding to the utility structure underlying ( ~). However, when price
controls are binding, consumer demand is not met at quoted prices. Define
virtual prices as the prices at which consumers would willingly consume the
rations allocated ( see Neary and Roberts ( t g8o) ):
aE[II(P„t),...] - h dE[...,~r(pr, t),U] - n ()
Pt'. ~p -
AR; ~r~ ~` - ar, ~
where AR ;a;) is the ration allocated in period t ' pfe~riod 2).
Under gradualism, consumers' intertemporal budget constraint is:
3T f Poí Y-S) -Cf óóo[p( y-1-si -c] - E (g)
while under a cold turkey approach we get:
3T-~P~`(~'-S)-Cfb~Pr,[p(y-~s~-c] - E (to)
3T is output in the T sector. The welíàre gain due to a small increase in the
ratiun is proportional to the wedge benveen controlled and virtual prices:
i
Er.d~,, - (P,.-Poi. (tt)
x
For given collapse prubability p(which will be endogenised in the next
section), the model is closed in each period by either a market clearing equation
for the :~'T market in case market prices prevail, or by an equation defining
virtual prices if price controls are operating and binding ( equations (8)).




y f ~(-S) - c-jj~ .
aP
(t2)
I.2. Aggregale S'upply Resj~onse, Hoardin; and Gradualism
Consider first the case where the inventory problem has an interior solution
.S'~`, and .l - fe - o lFig. t;; van ~Nijnbergrn ( t yy t) shuws that if S~` e~iscs, it
is uniyue. Difièrentiati~ic; ~,5) indicates the rclation betwren thr optimal level
of hoarding .S~` and the cullapse probability p:
d.S ~~ll~~`-P„)~ yj~ cu. ~t3)dp ~"' !' - t - "~
.
r~I~hi~ ia an appruxirnatiun bcc:.usc une slrould u.~r rlrc ccn:.inl~ cyuivalrnr uf thr .ccuud Ex.riod pricc
r.uócr rLan ILc cxpcrtcd v:cluc. tiincc tór indircct urilir~ luncriuu i. rnnvcx iu pncra, tóc twr~ ;rrc not tbc
.:un,
Tt~C)~2~ P~)LI'I'iI:,SL h;f;~)NOMY t)F PRICE RECORH I:jJ(~
A'I --- ---- ---
0
Ai I Low Po: H.S'
0 P I
Fiq. i. Nrt aGqrc~atr ~upply .ind ihe prnbability nf crillap~c.
If there is a collapse, anticipated capital gains will not materialise, because
in that case controls remain. Theretbre, a greater likelihood of collapse implies
a,;reater likelihood of no price rise between today and tomorrow, and thus
reduced hoarding incentives. So as credibility declines ( p increases), hoarding
declines and the observed supply response Y-S increases ( HS, Hoarding
Schedule, Fia. t).
If credibility is very low, a cornr.r solution may be reached where no
intertemporal speculation is profitable, S- o and ~l ~ o í the Aat segment in
Fig. t). This will clearly obtain lor the extreme case of no credibility at all
(p - t). At p- t, prices are not expected to rise, there will therefore not be any
hoarding and the H.S curve intersects the p - t axis at Y'~.
Compare now two stabilisation programmes, each `gradualist' : prices are
moved partially in period one but fully liberalised in period two. One
programme is more gradualist tlian the other in that the initial price response
is smaller ~`Low Pg' versus `High PQ'). A higher first period control price P9
increases the optimal level of first period output for given incentives to hoard
~cf (5) ). This means that the flat part of the hoarding schedule ! where hoarding
is zero and output at Y~), shifts up by the increase in Yp:
J~-dP -C;,;,~o. (14i
9
Also, higher initial prices mean lower percentage capital gains once the market
is liberalised. Thus the incentive to hoard will decline:
dS - (p}`Bsp~P9) ~~ c o.
dPg Noae - ~"~ci~





~ Ol. ( t6)
~„ ~ O1 means that the curved segment of the diagram in fact shifts up more
than the flat part. This implies that the point where hoarding becomes
unprofitable and HS Hat moves to the Ieft (cf. Fig. t). Also, with a higher Po,
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there will be less first period rationing, and hence less spill over into the market
for second period home goods (EyP ~ o). Thus p~ will be lower, further
reducing hoarding incentives; hence the area H.here .l - o shifts even further
left. Thus for given collapse probability p, bolder decontrol programmes
(larger initial price increases) will lead to less hoarding, larger increases in
output, and as a consequence, much less problems .vith shortages.
II. SHORTAGES AND THE PROBABILITY OF REFORM FAILURE
In most of the literature, credibility of policy reforms is exogenous. But
assuming exogenous credibility clearly limits the usefulness of the analysis, since
the impact of an.~ polic}- will most likely depend on whether it is going to be
sustained or not. Ize and Ortiz ( t g87) and Dornbusch ( I g8g) endogenise
credibilitv, linking credibility to various macroeconomic variables. The
equilibria they consider have primajacie plausible features. But their reliance on
an arbitrary relation between programme credibility and macro variables
makes one ..~onder whether that relation itself, for all its empirical plausibility,
would not be afíected b}. economic policy.
ln this paper we break new ground by drawing on recent innovations in the
analysis of the impact of political considerations on economic policy. Intuition
suggests a link between aggregate shortages in the earl}~ stages of the
programme and the likelihood that the programme will be abandoned
halfwa~~. Reform programmes can be aborted for many reasons. Government
officials mav be bribed by lobbyists seeking the rents created by the price
controls. A balance of payments crisis mav make it impossible to continue the
exchange rate policy on w~hich many such de-contrul programmes are built.
The political opposition may gather strength if the initial results are
disappointing. ~'e focus on the latter argument, arguably the most relevant
one for Eastern Europe.
At the beginning of period 2, before the Government can implement the
second stage of its reform programme, it faces a vote which determines whether
it can continue or whether the opposition takes over in period 2. p is the
probability that the latter happens. The ke. questiun is, what determines ~i?
The vote is de jac~o a vote for or against price controls, since the opposition
will reimpose (or continue) them. Voters vote for or against dependíng on the
impact of controls in period 2 on their personal welfare. Pricr rises have a
negative welfare eflect proportional to the initial ration receivrd. But the} will
be beneficial to the extent they raise supply, since at the margin, marginal




- - .-1;t -f- ( P, - Iu ) x- ( t 7 )
~1~e parameterise divergence of views by assuming that voters have dif3~erent
priors un thr aggregate supply elasticitv in the cr,ntrc~llc-d sector. There is a
I~92~ POL!'1'ICAL F.(;OYOA1ti' UF PRICE REFUR~1 t~r1l
continuum ofvoters, indexed by s. Deline.x - d( ~"-.Sj~dP. Voters entcr period
one ~~ith a particular prior distribution on x, and observe output respon~e in
period one. "Chev use that information to updnte their prior into a posterior
distribution used to assess the welfàre eRècts ofcontrolled versus uncontrulled
prices in period s. [n rrpdatin~ their prior, voters use Baves~ rulc. Thev are
ranked in ascendins; ordcr of their prior beliefon the value of x. Equation ~ r 7 ~
vields the x at which price chan~eti have zeru wrlCare eHèct, x~:
ha- .~f ,t
~ t 8 i
` IP~-P~)~
~~-elfare maximisin~ voters will vote ves or no depending on w~hether their
posterior mean is greater or smallcr than a~.
There is simple majority voting, and voters' preferences ocer the various
alternatives are single peaked. Thercfore the median voter, sm, casts the
decisi~e vote.' Voters know their own estimate of a and form rational
expectations about econumic a~J7rel;ates, but thev do not know e~ery other
voter's estimate of x. In particular thev do not know the magnitude of ,x~ sm),
the rnedian voter's estimate of the supply elasticitv. ~'oters' beliefs on thc
ma~nitude of a~sn,) are summarised bv a density function f. which we assume
to be the same scross voten.' Since the median voter determines the election
outcome, the probabilitv that the Government will be voted out before the
second part of ics decontrol programme equals the probabilin. that a(s,~) e a~:
~0 - I~r~ ~XJm C a~) - J 3t f(~.srn) IÍx,m. ~ 19)xam-- z
To assess how hoarding in period I affects the probabilitv of collapse of the
programme of price decontrol, consider how the updating process w.ill affect
f(am). Voters do not know each other's individual preferences, but they do
know that each voter updates his prior with Bayesian updating. li pdating w~ill
shift f(am) such thatfcontracts towards the voter who has a prior mean equal
to the value observed in period t. But the voter with prior mean x~ is more
relevant, since that is the cut-off point for the voting procedure.
The voter at a~ will shift up, down or stay ~vhere he is depending on whether
the observed supply elasticity in period t exceeds, talls short of, or equals a~. All
voters whose prior mean esceeds the supply elasticitv actuallv observed in
period I revise their estimate of a downward. Thus if enough hoarding takes
place to make the net supply response smaller than a,., the voter with prior
mean eqttal to a~ shifts to the left and more weight is concentrated in the part
off defined over (- oo, a~) . The probability of collapse therefore increases if
there is enough hoarding to cause a net supply response below a~ and uice t.ersa
if the actual suppl,v response exceeds a~. Withf' the distribution function of a.,m
i A votc carly in a major reform programme is likelv to tx dominated bv ~.~hether voters do or do not
support the proqramme. ~~'ith such a singte issue contest, median voter models are plausible descriptions o(
how voting mechanisms are likeh~ to work icL Enelow and Hinnich ~ ~q8{)j.
' A sirnilar usumption is used in .~Icsina and Cukicrman (~qqui.
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after the shift triggered by the incorporation of new information at the end of
period I, we get:
Y-Y-S
.Í~(a.,~)~ -.Í~(a.," f 0.~.) ~ ~.m - ( t -'~) ( oPa oPo -a,m
a~






7 o if (Yo-Yo-S)~(Pp-Po) c a~
(so)
G o if (Yo-Yo-S)~(Po-Po) ~ a~.J
Equation ( so) indicates a negative relation between p and net aggregate supply
response (the schedule VDS, for Voters Dissatisfaction Schedule, in Fig. ~.
0
P
Fig. s. Impact of aggrcgate supply response on collapsc probabiliry.
Which way will this locus shift when a more gradual reform is implemented
(i.e. a smaller price increase (Po - Po) in period t)? Difíerentiating (so)
indicates the answer: J Y'-Yo- fY-Y S)(I-~)




~ oJ ~ o.
(2I)
For any given net supply response larger than zero, the same quantity
response to a smaller price change implies a larger elasticity and thus a larger
upward (or smaller downward) revision from any given prior. This in turn
implies a larger shift to the right of the probability density functionf and hence
a steeper decline in p(see the part of i'DS' above o in Fig. s). A similar line
of reasoning applies to the case of negative supply response. Any given negative
response represents a more negative supply elasticity than the corresponding
une for the hifih Pp case since for the same quantity response the price change
[r~t~~!~ PULITI(;AL Et;U!~U~1ti' nF PRICE REFURM I.}r)`j
is smaller. 'I~his implics a lar~;rr shift to the left Ídowmvard revision nf prior
means! and thus a hi~hcr culLtpse probahilit}~ in the low P9 casr than in thr
high P~ case ~111 this makes li,r a cuunterclockwise rotation oCthe [~DSschrcíule,
tr, ['D.ti' in Fig. ~~, in rrspunse to a murc~ ,gradualist llower Pq~ dcct,ntrr,l
pru~ramrnr.
III. GRADUALISM, HOARlllNG AND THE POL["rICAL ECONOMY OF
PRICE REFORM
~~'ith thc twt~ building blocks (the Hoarding Schcdule HS' and the Voters
Dissatisfàctiun Schedule G'D.Sj derived, w-e can e~camine the consequrnces for
credibility and supply response Of a gradual price decontrol progamme.
H.S' in Fig. g indicates, for a given collapse probabilitv p, how much
producers chouse to hoard. A higher collapse probabilitv leads to lower
expected future prices and thus gives less uf an incentive to hoard. The H.S' locus
thrrefore slopes up. But more huarding luwers thr perceived supply elasticity and
therrfore strengthens the voters' assessment that the programme is failing; this
in tw-n increases the probability that the Government will be voted out. Thus
the political economy schedule G'DS slopes downward.
Y,-Yo-
P
Fig. 3. Hoarding, cullapse probabilics and price decontroL a rational expectations equilibrium.
Rationality requires that the probability of programme collapse used in
producers' hoarding decisions will indeed come out if those hoarding decisions
are in fact implemented. This will be the case at E, the intersection of the
Hoarding Schedule and the Voters Dissatisfaction Schedule. Thus E represents
a rational expectations equilibrium for a given gradual decontrol policy that
sets first period prices at Po and promises to liberalise in period s. At pB,
producers hoard SE for a total ( negative} supply response Yp,E-Yo-SE. In
turn, such a negative supply response leads to a private revision of the collapse
probability that exactly matches pE.
The equilibrium at E has many plausible features. Output rises, as current
prices increase.~ Thus the initial unemployment costs of such a decontrol will
' Sce Ortiz ; t qgo), Brasv ( t g87) and Hclpman ! t q881, on rcspectively Macico, Brazil and Israel. In each
case, substantial price increasa initiated what waz announced as a temporary ux of price controla.
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be quite small or even absent. How~ever, in spite of increased output and
higher prices, net suppl}~ actually reaching the market declines as producers
increase inventories, hoping for later capital gains. Therefore, shortages
develop, to the point that the net observed suppl~ elasticitp is in fact negative.
This in turn generates pressure against the decontrol policy, increasíng the
probabilitv that the programme will have to be abandoned for a prolonged
period of controls before the final deregulation phase is reached.
Consider the consequences of a more cautious start of the programme (a
lo~,.er initial period level of the controls). A lower initial price, for given collapse
probabilit~ p, results in larger capital gains once prices are liberalised. Thus for
given p, hoarding will in fact increase: HS shifts down to HS' in Fig. 2. If p
would not change, the new equilibrium would be at .9 in Fig. 2. Uf course more
hoarding implies a more negative perceived supply elasticit}~, which in turn
leads to a higher p. Thus, if the I'DS schedule itself would not shift, a new
equilibrium would emerge at 9', w~ith more hoarding and higher collapse
probabilitv: p,,- ~ Pe-
But there is more: for given nct aggregate suppl~~ response, a lower elasticity
is implied. because it is in response to a smaller price change; priors thus get
revised do".nw~ards more than they would under the less gradual decontrol
programme and the collapse probability incrrases í T'D.S' shifts out to T'DS'). Thus
the new- eyuilibrium is at E', with an unambiguously higher probabilit}- of
collapse: pF. 1 p~. ) pE. Thus a more gradual approach !o price decontro! actually
increase.s the collapse probabilily.
Huwever, although there will be an unambiguousl}~ lower output response to
more gradual decontrol, the impact on net aggregate supply is less clear. Un
the one hand, there is more hoarding for given p since the capital gain then
iticrcases; but on the other hand there will be less hoarding brcause p increases,
thus reducing the likelihood that this larger capital gain "~ill in fact materialise.
But it is clear from Fig. ~ that the net supply responsr inclusive of hoarding „~i11
remain nrgative if it was so to begin ,,.ith.
The samr machinerv c~m be used to assess' culd turkr~ ~ clrconn-ol approaches
(Fig. .~). L~nder a cold turkev appruach, prices are immediatrl,- and full,~
fïS. {. Culd iurkr~ ~~cnu. tir.~clu.~l ~~rirc d~-~~min,l.
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liberalised. Tluts if thr. appruach is m:tintaincd, prices will be market
determined in both periods. C;ndcr tlte assumptions made, the first period frce
market price P~ will equal the second period price~ p~`. Thus withuut credihilitv
problems, there would be no hoarding, as waitin,S Ibr tomorrow will not brin,~,
higher prices to ofTset storage and interest costs.
Credibilitv problems strengthen this result. If p J o, there is a positive
probability that second period prices will be lnwer than first period prices, in
case controls get reimposed; this would lead to capital losses on inventories
carried into period ~z. Thus with a`cold turkey' approach, there are strong
disincenliues to lioard.
Therefore, if dis-hoarding would be possihle, a cold turkey approach would
lead to a mu~.h larger observed net supply response than under gradualism.
This is because in that case, if there is any credibility problem at all, goods will
in fact be pulled out of inventories, for sale today rather than tomorrow. But
distioarding is not possible in our set-up, so under 'cold turkey' decontrol, the
zero-inventory-build-up case ( .~ - o) will ahvays obtain. This means that the
line labeled HS~~ in Fig. ~}, a horizontal line at Y~t- Y~ ~ Y9-Yo 1 0, represents
the cold turkey case. Thus lhere will be no áoarding under lhe cold tiv-key
approach.
The second clear result relates to credibility ( the equilibrium ~.alue of p~.
Since P' ~ Py, the G'DS schedule rotates further, clockwise and still crossing thc
same zero point ( compare VDS~~ with b'DSQ in Fig. 4 1. The cold turkev
equilibrium is at the intersection of VD.S~~ and HS~~, at E~,. Since there is no
hoarding under a cold turkey approach, there will be a high obser~~ed supply
elasticitv and thus a low probabiliry of progrnmme collapse p~, ~lower, for
example, than p(o)).
For comparison of the cold turkev decontrol strategy with a gradualist
approach, consider two possible configurations for the latter. If the initial
distortion is so small that there would be no hoarding at all in the gradual case
either ( i.e. ~l - o and net supply equals Yy~, Cr.,.,. ~ o would imply a smaller
supply response per unit ofprice increase than obser~-ed under the CT approach.
This in turn would impl}' a larger assessed probabilitv of collapse. So even if
there is no hoarding under gradualism i mild initial distortions and ~1 - o!,
gradual programmes will be less credible than cold turke~~ programmes if
Cy.},}, G o. Vloreover, since ~1 - o cases have been excluded í we onlv consider
se~~erelv dístorted cases), there will always be hoarding under gradualism.
Therefore, there is more of a downward revision of~ the supply elasticitv than
in the.l - o case, reinforcing the result just derived for the,~ - o case. In terms
of Fig. .}, HS9 falls below the line Y~- Yo at least for its initial ses;ment, and cuts
VDS9 more to the ri,ght. But a lower observed suppl}- elasticitv implies a higher
likelihood oi~ programme collapse!
Ifa ne;ati~-e initial suppl}- response obtains for the lower ranges ofp ~ HS cuts
che left vertical axis below o), the results are unambiguous: since the cold
turkey equilibrium is to the left ofp(o) while the gradualism equilibrium in that
case is to the right ofp(o), the collapse probabilitv under gradualism is alwavs
higher, whatever the sign of CY}.Y is ( cf. Fig. q.).
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Thus cold turkey programmes will unambiguously be more credible than gradual
programmes that actually cause increasing shortages in their initial phase ( pEg ~ p(o));
and even tJgradual programmes do not cause increasing shortages ( pED ~ p(o)), cold
turkey decontrol programmes will still be more credible if C}1,}. G o.
IV. CONCLUSION
Should price controls be abolished `cold turkey' or can a case be made for
gradualism' Two factors complicate the issue and are at the core of this paper.
Price controls often focus on commodities that are storable and can thus be
used in intertemporal speculation. Second, opposition to dismantling of
controls is often based on claims of low supply response, and greatly bolstered
if a strong supply response fails to materialise. This is especially relevant in
Eastern Europe, where experience writh markets is limited.
We shoH' the difficulties that these two factors create for gradual decontrol
ofprices. ~~-e endogenise the probability of a collapse of the reform programme
and show- that such endogeneity in the presence of intertemporal speculation
leads to a strong case against gradualism. The smaller the initial price increase,
the lower the observed supph' elasticity and the greater the probability that the
programme of reform w'ill be abandoned.
This implies that the policy that makes most sense from a microeconomic
point of view' (decontrol immediately) is also advisable from a macroeconomic
point of view'. Credibility problems, which are at the core of the transitional
output losses that characterise most stabilisation programmes, will be much less
under a cold turke}' approach and so will therefore transitional unemployment.
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